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We want to clarify the way in which we think about the global
commons, particularly the problem of global warming caused by
greenhouse gas emissions and tropical deforestation.  We develop
a policy framework in which the policy goal is the sustainability
of the earth's ability to absorb greenhouse gases.  The framework
considers the unequal incidence of benefits and costs of
particular policies.  We identify several resource management
regimes and suggest that management under a common property
regime is most appropriate.  We conclude by identifying and
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The term "global village" has become popular to suggest that the
entire world's population belongs to the same community.  Related
to this idea is the management of the earth's atmosphere as a
"global commons."  Following, we focus on the idea of the
commons, the concept of common property, and the ability of
resource management regimes to deal with the problems of the
global commons.  We hope to clarify the way in which policymakers
think about the global commons.  Then, we will suggest
appropriate policy measures to achieve certain goals concerning
the global commons.
THE COMMONS AND POLICY
What is the "global commons"?  One will hear that the global
commons consists of, for example, the earth's atmosphere, the
oceans, the international tropical forests (especially the
Amazon), biological diversity, and Antarctica.  It may surprise
the government of Brazil to learn that its forests are part of
the global commons.  Germans may have a similar reaction if told
that the Schwarzwald is part of the global commons.  Or, indeed,
the United States government would react in a similar way on
hearing that the forests of the Pacific Northwest are part of the
global commons.  And governments claiming territory in Antarctica
may challenge that continent's inclusion in the global commons.
The problem arises because of conceptual fuzziness--and conceit--
on the part of many advocates of environmental policies.
Conceptual fuzziness occurs because of a failure to explain why
natural resources as diverse as Antarctica, the oceans, and
Brazilian forests have suddenly become part of the "global
commons."  Antarctica and the Brazilian Amazon certainly have a
different legal status than the high seas and the earth's
atmosphere.  How can we justify classifying these diverse natural
resources as part of the global commons?
Moreover, conceit enters when, to preserve an extravagant,
energy-wasteful lifestyle, affluent people in the northern
hemisphere lecture Brazilian farmers about proper land use.
Imagine the humor--indeed indignation--had the European gentry
tried to interfere with the "taming (and plundering) of the West"
in 19th century America.
There are global environmental problems because the actions of
people or governments in one location seriously affect people and
governments in other locations.  Or, put another way, the
existing use of certain natural resources threaten individual
(and national) interests.  Global environmental policy problems
occur because these individuals (and governments) try to change
activities in far-off places.  They either do it because of
selfishness or because of their genuine concern for the
sustainability of life on earth.There is nothing inherently wrong with some selfishness.  And, of
course, it is fine to show concern for sustaining life on earth.
The problem comes in crafting a new resource management regime
that will change the behavior of individuals by changing the
incentives they face.  However, change is never easy.  And,
change under pressure from outside sources is even more
difficult.  A resource management regime for the global commons
will need to appeal to those who will benefit and those who will
suffer from a change.
A successful policy for the global commons will require aligning
interests so that each party feels as though it has gained.  We
say that the incentives are aligned when individuals want to
pursue the new policy.  Incentive alignment is the policy
problem; one must find ways to adjust interests through
realigning incentives for individual and group behaviors.
THE PROBLEM OF THE COMMONS
"The Dutch electricity industry will plant thousands of trees
around the world to compensate for carbon dioxide emissions from
a new power station, the association of Dutch electricity
producers says.  The 600-megawatt coal-fired power station in the
Maasvlakte area of Rotterdam is due to come on-stream in the
middle of the decade.  "The plant will be in operation for about
25 years and during that time it will emit 75 million tons of
carbon dioxide," says a spokeswoman for the group.  Carbon
dioxide is the main contributor to the greenhouse effect that
many scientists believe causes global warming.  Trees absorb
carbon dioxide through photosynthesis. "With our plan we will
fully compensate" for the new plant's emissions, says the
spokeswoman.  The industry will spend $12 million a year from
1991 to 2015 on the plantings, with the first likely to be in
Peru, Bolivia, Colombia or Indonesia" (The Wall Street Journal,
European Edition, November 7, 1990).
What could possibly cause the Dutch to spend $12 million annually
for 25 years in the far-away tropics?  The answer lies in their
recognition of the interrelations between their emissions of
carbon dioxide and global atmospheric chemistry.  More
significantly, however, it is evidence that the Dutch are taking
responsibility for their role in adding to problems in the global
commons.
What exactly are the alleged problems of the global commons?  The
benefits of preventing Antarctica from falling into the
territorial system of any one nation are so large as to compel
its international administration.  Simplistically speaking, some
would suggest that Antarctica should become the "private
property" of, say, the United Nations.  The benefits from
Antarctica arise from its role as a refuge for certain important
wildlife species and its role as a global research laboratory.
The world's oceans are a global commons in several respects.
Millions of citizens from many nations derive a significantportion of their food supply from marine environments.  Pollution
of this natural resource would thus threaten a very large number
of individuals--many of them now living at the margin of
survival.  Oceans also provide important transportation benefits
and are too critical to permit their control by any one nation.
The forests of the Amazon, and the earth's atmosphere, present a
slightly different picture.  Some will argue that the forests
have intrinsic value, and we ought to preserve them on those
grounds alone.  That is, regardless of the uses that the forests
allow, they are a significant part of our global heritage.
Another argument says that we need to preserve the Amazonian
forests because their services have global significance.  More
specifically, the Amazon forests are the "lungs of the earth."
This extensive biomass processes the large and increasing global
production of carbon dioxide.  These forests are the best hope
against significant changes in atmospheric chemistry and hence
possible global warming.
And so we come to the earth's atmosphere.  The linkage between
the earth's atmosphere and the Amazonian forests is direct and
important to sustaining life on earth.  Yet, preserving the
forests casts the interests of one group against the interests of
another.  Lumberers and developers stand united against those who
would protect the forests for their own sake--or because life as
we know it cannot continue.
We cannot cover fully, here, the problems of the oceans,
Antarctica, and the tropical forests as they relate to
atmospheric chemistry.  Therefore, we concentrate on the problems
of tropical land use and how these uses relate to atmospheric
chemistry and possible global climate change.  The nature of
tropical land use is a central factor in atmospheric chemistry.
For example, one estimate says that: "...South and Southeast Asia
contribute about 25% of the carbon dioxide emissions caused by
burning wood, or about 6% of total carbon dioxide emissions"
(Archer and Ichord 1989: 13).
However, the industrial world, with its fossil-fuel driven
factories and automobiles, is a major contributor to the total
annual production of greenhouse gases.  In stark terms, we
suggest that the wealthy citizens of the industrial north want to
protect the Amazonian "lungs of the earth" to process carbon
dioxide arising from our lifestyle.  Thus, the tropical forests
are a free waste-processing facility for the rich--whether in
Japan, Europe, or North America.  It is crucial to understand how
the lifestyle of the industrialized north impacts upon the nature
and extent of problems faced in the tropics.
We will, therefore, focus on the issue of greenhouse gases and
their effect on atmospheric chemistry and global climate (IGPB
1990).  Understanding greenhouse gases and devising workable
mechanisms to reduce them, are two very different activities.
Developing mechanisms for reducing greenhouse gases requires that
we first understand how activities in the contemporary world
place demands upon the atmosphere.  This means that we need to
develop a clear concept of the idea of resource services.  These
resource services of the global commons make it beneficial for
human use, yet they can become over-exploited when human use is
excessive.  Resource services are the capacity of the earth'satmosphere and biosphere to absorb and process certain levels of
greenhouse gas emissions without triggering long-run chemical
changes that will alter global climates.  In that sense, the
atmosphere and the earth's living plants, represent essential
resource services for the global climate.  If we overuse those
resource services, producing more greenhouse gases than the earth
can process, the change in atmospheric chemistry will have
catastrophic implications for life on earth.
The most compelling global environmental challenge is to
formulate and introduce a coherent management regime over the
resource services of the earth's atmosphere.  Unlike many local
environ-mental problems, the earth's atmosphere might be
extraordinarily difficult and expensive to fix once fouled.
Local toxic spills or radiation leakage from nuclear facilities
are also important.  But a degraded atmosphere represents an
environmental problem of a far greater magnitude.
The pertinent example for global climate change concerns the
chemical composition of the atmosphere.  This chemical
composition is largely a function of the rate of uptake and
release of several trace gases by the biosphere.  Similarly, the
sustainability of the biosphere is a function of the earth's
climate and the deposition of chemical compounds.  Biospheric
production of small amounts of carbon dioxide, methane, and
nitrous oxide trap terrestrial infrared radiation.  This leads to
an increase in the earth's surface temperature.  The debate about
the extent to which human activity is causing global warming is
one for earth scientists.  We start with the existence of
greenhouse gases, accepting the evidence that the chemical
composition of the earth's atmosphere is changing.  We also
accept the evidence of the earth sciences that the production of
greenhouse gases has been increasing.  To cite an authoritative
source:
"The chemical composition of the atmosphere has for the past few
centuries been changing, initially under the influence of
agriculture, more recently by industrial activities.  As a
consequence, the atmospheric volume mixing ratio of carbon
dioxide has increased from 280 to 350 ppm and for methane from
0.7 ppm to 1.7 ppm over the past two centuries.  Currently, the
measured annual increases of these gases are equal to 0.4-0.5%
and 0.7-1.1% respectively.  In addition the atmospheric
concentrations of several other trace gases are increasing.  The
most important among these are the industrially produced
chloro-fluorocarbon gases, but also nitrous oxide with annual
atmospheric growth rates of about 4%, 0.2-0.3%, respectively.
All  these gases have long atmospheric residence times, ranging
between about 10 years for methane and about 200 years for
nitrous oxide.  All these compounds are important greenhouse
gases.   Although carbon dioxide is the single most important
among them, the combined greenhouse forcing of methane,
chloro-fluorocarbon gases, nitrous oxide, and a few additional
gases together is about equal to that of carbon dioxide.  In
addition, and in contrast to carbon dioxide, which is chemically
very stable, methane, nitrous oxide, chloro-fluorocarbon gases
are of critical importance for stratospheric and tropospheric
chemistry.   The observed increases in the above mentioned gases
have caused great concern for a rapid climate warming by several
degrees in the next century, especially because of the rapidgrowth of chloro-fluorocarbon gases, major depletions in
stratospheric ozone have already occurred" (IGBP 1990: 2.1-3 -
2.1-4).
A POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE COMMONS
The problem is to craft a new resource management regime that, if
adopted, would result in improved management of greenhouse gases.
This resource management regime would first stabilize the net
production of greenhouse gases attributable to human activities.
Then, it would bring the production into balance with the earth's
capacity to assimilate such gases.  Such a resource management
regime would recognize the assimilative capacity for greenhouse
gases.  It would assure that this assimilative capacity--this
resource service--was put to the most valuable use.  It also
would assure that the long-run capacity of these particular
resource services did not diminish.
This imposes a constraint on management regimes that some may
regard as too restrictive.  Some insist that we should diminish
the resource service (the capacity to accommodate certain levels
of greenhouse gases).  After all, it may be economically
efficient to use up this resource service and to undertake some
other measure to offset that loss.  For instance, we could
discover new technology for some massive "gas sink" that would
remove the need for tropical forests and the atmosphere to
process greenhouse gases.  While we encourage efficiency, it is
more reasonable to explore institutional alternatives to assure
the sustainability of the existing resource services.
The task here is to link human activity to changes in the
production of greenhouse gases.  We first assume that human
activities are the cause of an important proportion of the total
annual production  of greenhouse gases.  Second, we assume that
potentially effective mechanisms exist--under the right
circumstances--that could change those activities.  Third, we
assume some action-forcing event occurs that brings the annual
net production of greenhouse gases to the forefront of the public
policy arena.  Finally, we assume that, as with any policy
change, there are potential winners and potential losers.  The
potential winners from a policy change will be the action-forcing
dimension of our policy problem, and the potential losers will be
the opposing force.
The common thread uniting the oceans, Antarctica, the earth's
atmosphere, and Amazonian forests  into something called the
"global commons" is also the disparity in the incidence of
benefits and costs.  That is they are divided by space with
benefits occurring in place A and costs being felt in place B.
This disparity or separation divides the perceived interests of
the parties involved in the policy problem.  Some individuals
(and governments) are paying unwanted costs, while other
individuals are reaping benefits at the expense of the former
[note 1].The policy problem has two central elements.  The first, just
discussed, concerns the size and incidence of the benefits and
costs of the status quo.  The second element concerns the
collective capacity to alter the previous condition.  For such
institutional change, it is necessary to document the potentially
large costs to continue the existing condition.
First, those seeking a change in the status quo may have the
legal ability to force that change upon the reluctant parties who
now benefit.  In this case, it is unnecessary to worry about
incentive alignment because some higher legal authority has the
power to alter, unilaterally, the resource management regime.
"Power" is the capacity for one party to impose a legal
arrangement on another party.  In this context, those now unhappy
with the present resource management have power if they can enact
and enforce laws making undesirable activities illegal.
However, without this kind of power, those seeking change may
have to encourage the present polluters to change their anti-
social actions.  Such encouragement may include compensation
schemes so the interests of the two parties become compatible.
Another potential scheme could include passive punitive
inducements.  For example, one party threatens to reduce
cooperation or aid to the other.
In assessing winners and losers and considering who might benefit
from new policies on greenhouse gases, we come immediately to the
very core of the problem.  That is, the winners are probably in
different places than the losers.  Winners are those who perceive
(or who will reap) benefits from a change in policy.  Losers are
those who perceive (or who will bear) costs from a change in
policy.  The status quo policy regime consists of the legal
production of greenhouse gases with privilege for those
responsible for emissions and no right for those adversely
affected.
Those wanting to cut the total annual production of greenhouse
gases do not have a legal right to bring about change. But, those
operating with the present policies have the legal right to
continue without regard for others. Those favoring the status quo
have, in legal parlance, privilege.
As suggested, it is difficult to change greenhouse gas emission
policies because of the areas in which they are produced.
Industrial activity and automobile exhaust, major contributors of
greenhouse gases, are more prevalent in industrialized nations.
In the tropics, greenhouse gases result from the rapid rates of
land-use changes and the associated burning of large quantities
of biomass.  Additionally, nitrogen fertilizers and deforestation
may increase atmospheric nitrogen significantly.  As the agrarian
nations become industrialized, they will probably add even more
greenhouse gases.  Disturbing the chemistry in the tropical
atmosphere is particularly significant since convective cloud
systems can rapidly transport emissions to other regions of the
world.
The policy problem is beginning to take shape.  Human activities
in the industrialized world generate large quantities of
greenhouse gases.  The tropical forests process much of that
production.  However, land uses in the agrarian tropics threatenthe sustainability of much of that forest cover.  This links land
use decisions in the agrarian nations to activities in the
industrialized nations of the world.  In the remainder of this
document, we will adopt the convenient shorthand of "North" to
denote the industrialized nations of the developed world and
"South" to denote the agrarian nations of the developing world.
Those in the North want to protect tropical forests as a means to
process the large and increasing production of greenhouse gases.
People in the North have one primary interest with two
implications.  Their primary interest is to maintain their
lifestyle and their fossil-based energy system.  They want to
find a way to: (1) maintain tropical forests to process
greenhouse gases and (2) discourage those living in the tropics
from increasing production of greenhouse gases.
People in the South have a primary interest in achieving economic
development.  This seems to imply: (1) cutting down tropical
forests to earn foreign exchange or to clear land for agriculture
and (2) building factories and buying automobiles for the newly
prosperous masses.  We could not have a more pronounced conflict
of interests between the two regions.
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT REGIMES FOR THE COMMONS
The problem of the global commons is that people in both the
North and South are free to engage in activities that produce
greenhouse gases without regard for the interests of their fellow
citizens.  They can also proceed without caring about people
living in other countries or in the future.  Public policy for
the global commons would change the rules and laws facing people
in both North and South.  Recall that all individual actions take
place within an institutional context that defines choices for
citizens of each country.
If electric utilities are free to emit large quantities of carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere, then this defines the choices for
other economic agents.  For instance, some people will have to
spend more money to reduce the undesirable effects from these
emissions.  People concerned with atmospheric chemistry and
global warming will seek to change current behaviors.  Those
pleased by the status quo will claim that they have a "right" to
those emissions.  But people worried about global warming will
object that traditional use of the airshed for waste disposal
does not constitute a "right" for the electric utilities.
Rather, they will say that the electric utilities have imposed
their actions on others long enough.  Indeed, those who care
about greenhouse gases will probably say that they have a "right"
to be free from harmful emissions of electric utilities and other
industrial polluters.
The basic issues at hand are the actual and presumed rights that
define the positions of the two parties.  Current property
arrangements cause existing behaviors that result in conflicts
with those who believe that their "rights" have been violated.On Rights and Correlated Duties
A right is the capacity to call upon the authority of the group
(the state) to protect one's claim to a benefit stream.  Notice
that rights are only effective when there is an authority system
that will defend a right-holder's interest in a particular
outcome.  If you have a right in some particular situation, then
it means that you can turn to the state to have your claim
protected.  The protection you receive from this authority is
simply the reciprocal obligation for all others interested in
your claim.
A right is a three-part relationship that encompasses a person,
the object of that person's interest (whether a physical object
or future benefits), and all others who must respect that
person's right.  Rights are not relationships between a person
and an object.  Rather they are relationships between a person
and others interested in that object.  Rights can only exist when
there is a social mechanism that gives duties and binds
individuals to those duties.
When one has a right in something, it means that the state
consciously protects the benefits arising from that situation.
The state gives and takes away rights by its willingness--or
unwillingness--to agree to protect one's claims in something.
Returning to the global commons problem, the ability of an
electric utility to discharge carbon dioxide is properly
characterized as a privilege.  The electric utility enjoys the
benefits of low-cost waste disposal.
The electric utility's costs to produce energy are low because it
can discharge carbon dioxide without compensating people harmed
by the discharge.  Since harmed individuals have no effective way
to prevent the utility from discharging harmful gases, the
utility enjoys a gas-emissions privilege.  In this situation,
people have no rights because they cannot call upon the state to
stop the emissions.  The utility therefore has no duty to stop
its emissions.  These concepts require further clarification.
Environmental policy is about rights and duties.  It is also
about benefits and costs to various interests.  This perspective
focuses attention on the struggle over rights and duties as
correlated ideas.  In 1917, W. N. Hohfeld recognized their
correlation when he proposed four sets of relationships that he
considered the essence of legal standing among individuals in a
society.
First, we should note the difference between legal relations and
a legal system.  No society is a "going concern" without a
certain degree of social order.  The institutional arrangements
of that going concern --its working rules-- create the social
order that allows it to function and to survive.  The ways in
which those institutions are formulated and enforced make up the
legal system of that society.  Society's recognition of a
specific set of ordered relations among individuals is a legal
relation.When discussing the four fundamental legal relations, we start
with two individuals (Alpha and Beta).  Table 1 shows the four
fundamental legal relations.
Table 1. The Four Fundamental Legal Relations
               Alpha          Beta
Static         right          duty
Correlates
               privilege      no right
Dynamic        power          liability
Correlates
               immunity       no power
(Bromley 1991)
A right means that Alpha can call upon the state to enforce a
claim to protect against the claims of Beta.  A duty means that
Beta must behave in a specific way with respect to Alpha.
Alpha's ability to make the state enforce a right compels Beta's
duty.
The second correlate is that of privilege and no right.  With
privilege, Alpha is free to behave without regard for Beta's
interests.  In the present context, electric utilities (Alpha)
can discharge greenhouse gases without regard for people who care
about the fate of the biosphere (Beta).  The opposite of
privilege is no right.  In this case, Beta has no recourse if
Alpha emits large quantities of carbon dioxide.  Privilege and no
right are static, meaning they exist at a point in time.
Turning now to the dynamic aspect, power means that Alpha may
create a new legal relation affecting Beta.  That is, Alpha can
force Beta into a new situation that may be disadvantageous to
Beta.  The correlate of power, liability, means that Beta is
subject to a new legal relation created by Alpha.  Finally,
immunity means that Alpha is not subject to Beta's attempt to
create a new legal relation affecting Alpha.  The correlate of
immunity, no power, means that Beta may not create a new legal
relation affecting Alpha.  Power, liability, immunity, and no
power are dynamic, meaning they change over time.
This situation is perfectly symmetrical with respect to the
positions of Alpha and Beta.  The legal relation is identical
regardless of whether you view it from Alpha or Beta's position.
The difference lies "...not in the relation which is always two
sided, but in the positions and outlook of...(Alpha and
Beta)...which together make up the two converses entering into
the relation" (Hoebel 1942: 955).
Note that you can reduce the four fundamental legal relations
into two further categories that are either active (positive) or
passive (negative).  The right/duty and the power/liability
relations are active in that they represent dual expectations
subject to the authority of the state.On the other hand, the privilege/no right and immunity/no power
relations are passive because they are not subject to direct
legal enforcement.  Instead, they limit the state's activities by
defining the types of behavior that are beyond the interest of
the state.  As seen in the privilege instance, the state declares
that it has no direct concern if Alpha imposes costs on Beta.  In
a sense, we have legal relations that are statements of no law.
Every right that Alpha has upon Beta is reinforced by
accompanying pressure on courts to compel Beta to perform his/her
duty.
Possible Resource Management Regimes
Natural resource management regimes evolve over time to mediate
conflicting interests among users.  The essence of a resource
management regime is that it defines--or fails to define--a
structure of rights to benefit streams.  At the same time, a
resource management regime defines a vulnerability (exposure) to-
-or the absence of vulnerability--to a stream of future costs.
The regime, the human creation, defines a structure of legal
correlates.  The above concepts of right, duty, privilege, and no
right operate within, indeed define, what we mean by a resource
management regime.
We call a set of rights to a benefit stream property rights.  Now
let us specifically explore the scope and nature of property
rights in four possible resource management regimes.  We
emphasize regimes as human creations whose purpose is to manage
people in their use of environmental resources.
Remember that a resource management regime is a structure of
legal relations comparing the standing of individuals to one
another with respect to that particular environmental resource.
The resource could be fish, an oil pool, or the assimilative
capacity of the atmosphere.
Institutional arrangements are continually established (and
redefined) to determine (and to modify) the scope and nature of
the property regime over natural resources.  Recall that we have
defined property relations between two or more people (or groups)
by stating that one has a right only when all others have a duty.
We must understand that property is not an object, such as land.
Instead, it is a right to a benefit stream that is only as secure
as the duty of others to respect the conditions that protect that
stream.
If you have a right, you expect that those with duty will respect
both the law and your claims.  And it is the function of the
state to restrain those with duty.  If the state is unwilling, or
unable, to assure compliance to duty, then rights are
meaningless.
Much of the confusion in environmental policy stems from a
fundamental misunderstanding of possible resource regimes.  The
"tragedy of the commons" idea has helped confuse scholars and
prevent meaningful understanding of resource management regimes.Among these possible regimes, common property carries the
misplaced blame for "inevitable" resource degradation that really
lies with open access regimes.  Hardin's symbol of the "tragedy"
has been remarkably durable.  It confuses an open access regime
(a free-for-all) with a common property regime (which specifies
behavioral rules).  This comparison ignored the possibility that
resource users could act together and institute checks and
balances--rules and sanctions--for their own interaction within a
given environment.
The traditional analysis is not only socially and culturally
naive, it is historically false (See Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop
1975, Baker and Butlin 1973, and Dahlman 1980).  To emphasize the
"tragedy of the commons" is to deflect analytical attention from
one class of social arrangements that could overcome resource
degradation.  Some observers may well attribute resource
degradation to an assumed (but non-existent) regime of "common
property."
They then suggest that, if only private property rights could
replace the common property regime, the problem would be solved.
Yet, when they observe resource degradation, such as soil erosion
or water pollution on private lands, they do not assume the cause
is the property structure.  Instead, they blame the owner's
unduly short planning horizon or some incentive problem that they
can fix with taxes or bribes.  In other words, they claim private
property is the salvation in one setting.  Yet, when private
property is present, the blame always seems to lie elsewhere.
This asymmetry of logic obscures the real issues.
The serious erosion of the 1930s Dust Bowl years during the
American economic depression has never been blamed on the private
ownership of land.  Rather, "drought" caused the problem.
However, if private ownership of land is socially optimal--as
many claim--how did this disaster happen?  If similar land abuse
occurs under an institutional regime other than that of private
property, the blame immediately shifts to "common property."  It
is obvious that we need a more careful analysis of property
regimes.
We will consider four resource management regimes: (1) non-
property regimes (open access), (2) private property regimes, (3)
state property regimes, and (4) common property regimes.  They
will provide organizing concepts to help us think about the
global commons.
Open Access Regimes
Open access regimes are situations in which each user has
privilege regarding the use of the resource.  It follows,
therefore, that each user also has no right.  In an open access
regime, there is no authority system to enforce behavioral norms
among participants concerning the natural resource.  When "the
rule of capture" allows early users to control the future of
valuable natural resources, it may be because those resources
were never part of a regulated social system.  They also could
have become open access resources through institutional failures
that have undermined former collective or individual management regimes.Advocates for the so-called "tragedy of the commons" imagine that
"property" is a physical object such as a fish, a forest, a piece
of land, or the atmosphere.  By confusing the social dimension
and the concept of property [note 2] with a physical object, it
is easy to see how they conclude that open access constitutes
"common property."  If we mistakenly think of fish as "property,"
and if fishing is available to everyone, then we think "property"
is "commonly available."  It is this conceptual confusion that
allows people to allege that "everybody's property (fish) is
nobody's property (fish)."  Since no one owns the fish, they seem
to be common to all.  But property is not a physical object;
instead, it is a social relation defined by the above legal
correlates.
Private Property Regimes
While most of us think of private property as individual
property, we need to remember that all corporate property is also
private property.  We also tend to think that the owner has
absolute control of private property.  However, owners face many
restrictions in the use of so-called "private" land and its
natural resources; few owners are free to do as they wish with
their assets.
The advantages of private control of land and natural resources
is that the owner can manage and invest knowing that good
stewardship will bring positive returns.  There can be no mystery
about this, and its appeal is practically as old as recorded
history.
A few assumptions make this property regime preferable under most
circumstances.  First we must assume that the owner chooses to
manage well and to produce those objects valued by society.  As
long as landowners produce wheat, tomatoes, trees, and cotton all
is well.  When they begin to produce marijuana, opium, and
cocaine, then the automatic goodness of private property rights
disappears.  So, we moderate the compelling nature of private
property regimes depending on its end result.
Second, private property is socially compelling as long as the
interests of the owner agree with the interests of non-owners.
That is, if we assume there are no negative effects coming from
the land and natural resource use, then the owner has complete
control.  If soil erosion, polluting smoke, clangorous sounds, or
insufferable odors come from a private property regime, then once
again the control of that institutional set-up will be under
scrutiny.
Third, private property is socially useful as long as it induces
industry rather than substitutes for it.  To quote Tawney in a
historical treatment of private property:
"Property was to be an aid to creative work, not an alternative
to it....  The patentee was secured protection for a new
invention, in order to secure him the fruits of his own brain,
but the monopolist who grew fat on the industry of others was to
be put down.  The law of the village bound the peasant to use his
land, not as he himself might find most profitable, but to growthe corn the village needed....  Property reposed, in short, not
merely upon convenience, or the appetite for gain, but on a moral
principle.  It was protected not only for the sake of those who
owned, but for the sake of those who worked and of those for whom
their work provided.  It was protected, because, without security
for property, wealth could not be produced or the business of
society carried on (Tawney 1978: 139)."
The case for private property regimes, as with all property
regimes, ultimately rests on judgments concerning its social
utility [note 3].  Private property is the legally- and socially-
sanctioned ability to exclude others--it allows the fortunate
owner to force others to go elsewhere.  Using a private property
regime to deal with problems of the global commons is
unrealistic.  Obviously, it is impossible to define individual
property rights in the atmosphere.  Therefore, we must search for
an alternative institutional structure--a different resource
management regime.
State Property Regimes
In a state property regime, the state owns and controls use.
Individuals and groups may be able to use the natural resources
but only with permission of the government representing the
state.  State (or "national") forests and parks and military
reservations are examples of state property regimes.  The
government may directly manage and control the use of state-owned
natural resources through its agencies.  Or, it may lease the
natural resource to groups or individuals who then have use
rights for a specified period.
For the global commons, the parallel of a state property regime
would be a supra-national body with authority over otherwise
sovereign states.  That is, we would add one more "layer" to the
structure to create--in essence--a super state.  Presently some
international regimes work to subordinate national interests for
transnational interests (Young 1989).  At the opposite pole of
state (or suprastate) property regimes, we find individual
property rights regimes--most commonly but imprecisely referred
to as private property.
Common Property Regimes
The final resource management regime is the common property
regime.  First, common property represents private property for
the group of co-owners.  Others can neither use the resource or
make decisions about it.  Second, individuals have rights (and
duties) in a common property regime (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop
1975).  In one important sense then, common property has
something very similar to private property; they both exclude
non-owners.
In that sense, we may think of common property as corporate group
property.  The property-owning groups vary in nature, size, and
internal structure across a broad spectrum.  But they are social
units with definite membership and boundaries and with certain
common interests.  They have at least some interaction among
members, some common cultural norms, and often their own internalauthority systems.  Tribal groups or sub-groups, sub-villages,
neighborhoods, small pastoral groups, kin systems, or extended
families are all possible examples.  These groupings hold
customary ownership of certain natural resources such as farm
land, grazing land, and water sources (Netting 1976, McKean 1992,
Stevenson 1991, Wade 1992).
The Hierarchy of Property Regimes
Earlier, we suggested that the four types of property regimes may
be too distinct.  However, they often overlap in practice.  For
example, corporate group property regimes can be compatible with
individual use of a resource held under common property.
For instance, in usual tenure systems over much of Africa, a
group may own certain farmland.  The group's leaders then assign
land use rights to individuals or families.  As long as those
people cultivate their plots, no one else has the right to use it
or to benefit from its produce.  But, the cultivator holds use
rights only (usufruct) and cannot alienate or transfer the
ownership or the use of that land to another person.  When the
current cultivator stops using the land, it reverts to the
control of the corporate ownership of the group.
Common property regimes in the developing world often have group
"ownership," with management authority from the group or its
leaders.  In many developing countries, some of the resources in
the public domain (non-private land) are managed as common
property.  The public sector manages some as state property.  And
some are not managed at all but are open access.
For any property regime, it is essential that an authority system
can meet the expectations of rights holders.  Private property
would be nothing without the requisite authority system that
makes certain the rights and duties are adhered to.  The same
requirements exist for common property.  When the authority
system breaks down, management of the natural resource fails, and
common property degenerates into open access.
The common property regime as a system also includes use rights,
exchange rights, distribution rights, a management subsystem, and
authority instruments.  When any part of this system breaks down,
the entire system changes.  The management subsystem, with its
authority mechanisms and capacity to force compliance, insures
compliance with and integrity of the property regime.
This is the same way in which the other property regimes operate
as systems.  In private property regimes, the owner also relies
on state authority and its coercive power to assure compliance
and prevent intrusion by non-owners.  Without this (or other)
authority, the private property regime would collapse and become
an open-access regime.The Global Commons and Resource Regimes
In an open-access regime, such as the current global commons,
each individual can produce greenhouse gases without regard for
the interests of those adversely affected.  We say that each
individual has, at the same time, both privilege and no right.
The individual has privilege in that he/she may disregard the
concerns of others.  At the same time, any one individual has no
right in that it is impossible to force others not to discharge
greenhouse gases.
The policy problem with greenhouse gases is to find a new
resource management regime other than the present open access.
If there were a meaningful supra-state, then it would be possible
to imagine a state property regime over the global airshed.  This
regime adds, in effect, one more layer of authority over the
existing regimes of sovereign nations.  It is the regime we find
concerning a variety of natural resources (Young 1989).  For
instance, the International Whaling Commission provides a supra-
state management regime which protects the interests and choices
of each state.  This, in turn, compels each state to redefine the
range of choice open to its individual whaling operations (Young
1989).
Lacking the creation of a supra-state property regime, the next
possible regime is one of common property.  Under this regime,
there would be no external source of compliance.  But the two
states, North and South, would structure an institutional regime
that would modify choices for their citizens.  Let us now
consider that problem.
INTERNATIONAL POLICY FOR THE COMMONS
In international policy there is no supra-state authority system
that can force the government of the South to abide by the
interests of the government of the North.  But, of course, the
two states have mutual interests.  The problem is to explore the
nature and extent of those interests.  New policies
can take advantage of any mutuality of interests.
Facilitative Policies
We can use facilitative policies when the two governments (or the
two parties) have compatible interests.  The government of the
South might desire a certain technology that would make large
industry more efficient in its consumption of fossil fuels.
For instance, the government of the South could seek nuclear
power generating facilities to reduce its dependence on imported
petroleum.  This alternative technology would reduce greenhouse
gases and please the government of the North.  Moreover, thegovernment of the North may want to export certain technologies
to other nations.  A mutual trade and technical assistance pact
might help to alter the production regime of greenhouse gases in
the South.
Inducing Policies
Inducing policies are relevant when the interests of the
government of the North and of the South are incompatible.  In
domestic policy, governmental authority is usually sufficient to
enforce new policies that may not satisfy everyone.  For
instance, as long as there is sufficient support for the action,
the government can impose pollution taxes on an industry which
strenuously objects.
In the international domain there is usually no similar capacity
to coerce unwilling participants.  However, redefining the
interests of the two governments can make inducing policies self-
enforcing on the part of the reluctant government.
We might think of this as international "cooperation."  Put in
those terms, it is not surprising that areas of willing
bargaining exist among states that have very different interests
in particular behaviors.  Here we mean that the interests do not
have to match exactly.  But one can map the interest of one into
the interests of the other.
Consider the preservation of tropical biomass to process
greenhouse gases.  We assume that the government of the North has
a deep and abiding interest in preserving as much tropical
biomass as possible.  The more tropical biomass to process
greenhouse gases, the less strict the North has to be in a new
environmental policy for greenhouse gases.
Perhaps the government of the South has little interest in
preserving tropical biomass.  Preserving expanses of forest may
deprive the government of the chance to earn large amounts of
foreign exchange.  It also may force the government to undertake
other economic development policies to deal with the problems of
the landless peasants clamoring for new land.  Indeed, preserving
the tropical forests may require the South to take over large
estates of wealthy ranchers and then redistribute these lands to
the landless.  The tropical frontier now provides a "safety
valve."  It allows the government of the South to offer land to
the poor without having to confront the landed gentry.
However, these two incompatible interests have a common element.
The desire of the North to protect the tropical forests suggests
that it may be willing to pay the South to preserve its tropical
biomass.  Unlike domestic policy, where government coercion is
possible, international policy requires reciprocity between the
principal (the North) and the agent (the South).
The government of the South might seek a large increase in
economic assistance to promote economic opportunities for its
landless poor.  That is, foreign aid may be useful in breaking
the difficult choice between taking over haciendas and savagingthe forest.  Similarly, if preserving forests means confronting
the powerful timber industries then maybe payments from the North
could redirect these contractors into other lines of work.
Injunctive Policies
It may be, of course, that the mutual interests area is too small
to accomplish what the principal (the North) seeks.  Perhaps
political pressure on the government of the South to continue
timbering is too overwhelming to be overcome by payments (or
policy concessions) from the North.  In this case, and depending
upon the resolve of the North, we begin to approach the domain of
injunctive policies.
If the North is importing the timber from such practices, the
solution is straightforward.  The government of the North could
simply decide to ban exports from the South.  If, however, the
South is exporting the timber to a third country, then that
government will also need to take part in the negotiations.  The
problem now becomes more complex.  The North could undertake a
whole range of policy options, facilitative, inducing, or
injunctive, to persuade this third government to change its
timber-importing policies.
Injunctive policies are the last resort because they create
"winners" and "losers."  The essence of long-run international
policy is to seek outcomes that allow both governments to
interpret their new position as that of a "winner."  With
facilitative and inducing policies there is a potential for both
parties to consider themselves winners in that they both got
something they desired.  With injunctive policies one party will
always feel coerced.
Besides the psychic problem of creating winners and losers,
injunctive policies have the great disadvantage that they are not
self enforcing.  International policy is, to a large extent,
dealing with parties in a "state of nature."  By a state of
nature, we mean a situation in which there is no state to enforce
agreed-upon bargains.  There is an emerging literature on how to
enforce agreements in a state of nature (Kronman 1985)[note 4].
The problem is that self-enforcement is unlikely when one or more
parties (states) believe that they have been forced into a
situation different from their long-run interests.  Then the
tendency for defection from the agreement is strong and likely to
grow over time.
Choosing the Optimal Policy
Facilitative and inducing policies have the great advantage in
that both parties stand to gain something from the agreement.
This practical advantage can hold the agreement together when
normal events may make the parties begin to doubt.  Knowing that
defection will deny access to something of very great value,
facilitating and inducing policies--when structured well--makedefection too costly.  Therefore, an optimal international policy
regime is one in which the costs of defection exceed the costs of
remaining in the agreement.
CONCLUSIONS
In some instances, we have seen an interest in solving problems
of the global commons originating from citizens in the
industrialized countries of the world.  People in the poorer
countries, on the other hand, may regard economic development as
their first priority.  Potential conflicts arise when those in
the North encounter reluctance on the part of governments in the
South to undertake actions to preserve forests.  These Southern
governments, facing serious economic development pressures, may
regard the forests as a source of foreign exchange and as a
possible site for agricultural expansion.
Sustainable international agreements for the global commons will
only emerge when all parties sense a fair sharing of the benefits
and costs of new policy regimes.  The industrialized North should
be ready to offer financial inducements to governments of the
South in exchange for more stringent environmental regulations.
At the same time, the North must reduce its use of environmental
resources if it hopes to solve the problem of greenhouse gases
and global climate change.
ENDNOTES
1. Economists will recognize this situation as one of
externalities.
2. Kant calls this "intelligible possession."
3. See Becker (1977) for a discussion of the philosophical
foundations of private property.  His work is also summarized in
Bromley (1991).  See Sax (1983) for a discussion of recent
changes in perceptions regarding the social utility, in certain
situations, of private property rights.
4. The literature on international regimes tends to refer to a
state of nature as one of anarchy--a term that may conjure up
notions of total chaos.  However, by anarchy this literature
simply means the absence of an overarching authority system to
enforce agreements (Young 1989).REFERENCES
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